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Previous research has suggested that the smallest firms are those most vulnerable to 
international competition, as measured by exchange rate fluctuations and import shares.  
However, that work – and the overwhelming bulk of the empirical literature on determinants of 
exit or firm survival – dealt entirely with the manufacturing sector of the economy.  Are firms 
further down the distribution chain, small wholesalers and retailers, hurt by real exchange rate 
movements?   Annual data for 1989-2005 are analyzed to explain small firm exit rates in several 
employment size categories – under 10 employees, 10-19 employees, 20-99 employees, and 100-
499 employees.  While there is variation across industry sectors, the basic result is that 
wholesalers respond negatively to a stronger currency in a manner similar to that of 
manufacturers, while retailers are generally unaffected. Do International Shocks Affect Small Wholesalers and Retailers? 
 
 




I.  Introduction 
Previous research has suggested that the smallest firms are those most vulnerable to 
international competition, as measured by exchange rate fluctuations and import shares.  
However, that work – and the overwhelming bulk of the empirical literature on determinants of 
exit or firm survival – dealt entirely with the manufacturing sector of the economy.  Are firms 
further down the distribution chain, small wholesalers and retailers, hurt by real exchange rate 
movements? 
 
Annual data for 1989-1998 for 58 SIC-based wholesale and retail sectors and for 1998-
2005 for 48 comparable NAICS-based sectors,
1 from the Statistics of US Business (SUSB), 
available from the US Small Business Administration (in collaboration with the US Census 
Bureau), are analyzed below to explain small firm exit rates in several employment size 
categories – under 10 employees, 10-19 employees, 20-99 employees, and 100-499 employees.  
While there is variation across industry sectors, the basic (and perhaps not terribly surprising) 
result is that wholesalers respond negatively to a stronger currency in a manner similar to that of 
manufacturers, while retailers are generally unaffected. 
                                                 
*Professor of Economics, American University.  I am grateful for financial support from the U.S. Small Business 
Administration under Contract # SBAHQ08M0246, and to Brian Headd for helpful comments and suggestions.  
Views expressed are mine alone, and are not those of the U.S. Small Business Administration. 
1 Restaurants and bars were included as “retail” in the SIC system, but as “services” in the NAICS system.  This 
sector is included in the analysis below.  One would expect, however, that firm survival in these sectors will be less 
closely related to fluctuations in exchange rates than would be the case in sectors involving the sale of goods (some 
of which may be imported). 
  1 
II. Literature Review and Theoretical Motivation 
  While a long literature has analyzed determinants of entry (see Siegfried and Evans 
(1994) and Geroski (1995) for surveys), the focus on determinants of firm survival or exit has 
increased in recent years.  Khemani and Shapiro (1987) find that high market concentration acts 
as a deterrent to entry, and (surprisingly) that high profit industries experience more exits; the 
latter effect is explained as high profits attracting more entrants who then displace some 
incumbents.   Dunne et al. (1988) provides a detailed descriptive analysis of patterns of entry, 
exit, and growth in US manufacturing over the 1963-82 period.  They find small, relatively new 
firms to have the highest failure rates, though survival probabilities seem to depend on how firms 
originally entered the market – most successful are firms diversifying from other manufacturing 
industries through new-plant construction.  Phillips and Kirchhoff (1989) provide evidence that 
survival rates of new firms are higher than previously thought, with almost half of all new 
manufacturing firms surviving at least 6 years; furthermore, they report that survival chances are 
still higher for those new firms showing growth in the early years.   
 
  Audretsch (1994), for U.S. data, and Wagner (1994), in a similar German study, 
investigate the link between firm start-up size and subsequent exit rates. Their results are 
somewhat mixed; Audretsch, examining data (obtained from the US Small Business 
Administration) on more than 12,000 US manufacturing plants established in 1976, finds that 
establishments larger on entry had a lower chance of exit over the next 10 years, while Wagner 
observes no clear link between start-up size and exit rates; he does, however, confirm for 
German firms the Phillips and Kirchoff (1989) finding  that surviving firms are more likely to 
  2have experienced high rates of growth in their early years.  Audretsch and Mahmood (1995) took  
a further look into the SBA dataset utilized in Audretsch (1994), with similar findings – they also 
note that an economic expansion leads to reduced exit rates, though no investigation of the role 
of international factors is undertaken. 
 
Little previous work has examined international effects on survival/exit rates.  DeBacker 
and Sleuwagen (2003) analyze data on Belgian manufacturing industries to determine the impact 
of foreign competition (both through imports and inbound foreign direct investment, FDI) on 
entry and exit rates of domestic entrepreneurs.  They find that this international competition does 
increase domestic exit rates, though firms may be able to respond strategically to FDI in ways 
that lessen its impact.  Feinberg (2008) found that international pressures, in the form of import-
share-weighted exchange-rate appreciation, lead to increased rates of smallest-firm exit in 
manufacturing, though the magnitudes of these effects are smaller than sometimes discussed.     
 
  Several authors have noted that determinants of survival or exit may differ between retail 
(and wholesale) establishments and manufacturing firms.  Petrunia (2007) notes, consistent with 
Pakes and Ericson (1998), that retailer size and survival seem more dependent on initial 
conditions of entry than is the case for manufacturers; while for both retailers and manufacturers 
smaller firms are more likely to fail, “the stochastic process determining the growth of 
manufacturing firms is different from that of retail firms (p. 878).”
2  Eckert and West (2008), 
studying privatized liquor stores in Canada, find that (not surprisingly) older firms are more 
                                                 
2 Audretsch et al. (1999) also find the dynamic patterns of post-entry growth and survival in services differ from 
those in the manufacturing sector. 
  3likely to survive, geographic location is important in determining survival probabilities, and 
more generally firm-level heterogeneity is important to consider. 
 
  The impact of international competition on wholesalers and retailers is less obvious than 
its effect on domestic manufacturers.  To the extent that currency appreciation results in lower 
prices on manufactured goods which can be passed on in the distribution chain to consumers, 
wholesale and retail sales may increase and these firms may prosper.  However, if upstream 
manufacturers respond by pressuring the downstream wholesalers and retailers to tighten 
margins the impact may not be as favorable.   
 
  There are also other issues which may be relevant.  If appreciation increases the need for 
larger scale by wholesalers (perhaps to deal with expanded volumes of imports), this may lead to 
consolidation, hence exit by some.  Also, if (perhaps differing by sector) wholesalers are more 
closely tied to particular manufacturers or to either domestic or foreign distribution channels (but 
not both) there will be a negative response to appreciation similar to that of domestic 
manufacturers.  On the other hand, retailers may be more comfortable buying from the cheapest 
source and will do well with lower manufactured/wholesale prices as the external value of the 
currency gains. 
 
  Before turning to a look at the empirical evidence, however, it must be acknowledged 
that business closure (“exit”) may not always reflect “failure”; Headd (2003) found that about a 
third of closed businesses regarded themselves as successful at closure.
3  This suggests that to 
                                                 
3 Similarly, Holmberg and Morgan (2003) caution against oversimplifying the issue as one of “survival” vs. 
“failure.” 
  4fully explain the exit decision by small firms, one would ideally like to go beyond the industry, 
macroeconomic, and international influences considered below – and consider more 
idiosyncratic individual explanations for why individual firms choose to shut down.  At the level 
of industry detail this is not possible, but we should not be surprised if expected patterns 
explaining small firm failure do not seem to well predict closure. 
 
III.  Descriptive Statistics 
  The SUSB data on exit by industry is actually “establishment deaths” – while this can be 
a firm exit it also may mean a retailer or wholesaler closing down a particular store or facility 
while remaining in operation.  While the distinction is not made at the level of industry detail 
used in this study, a look at the more aggregate data for all retail and wholesale is illuminating.    
Tables 1a and 1b present – only for the 2004-2005 period – establishment deaths in wholesale 
and retail in the four size categories studied here and the extent to which these represent firm 
exit.  We examine 40 retail industries in the 1990-98 period, 30 in the 1999-2005 period, and 18 
wholesale industry categories over the entire time period; industry titles are given in an appendix 
to this report.
4  One point to note in Tables 1a and 1b is the disproportionate role of very small 
business; for both the wholesale and retail sectors, there are more than twice as many 
establishments with under 10 employees than in the other three size categories usually regarded 
as small businesses (i.e., under 500 employees) combined. 
 
                                                 
4 I have dropped the retail category of “department stores” which had small numbers of establishments under 500 
employees, especially in the two smallest size categories, and numbers wildly fluctuating in the SUSB data from 
year to year (e.g., for 1996, 1997, and 1998, the data reports 1, 52, then 6 firms for establishments under 20 
employees). 
  5Table 1a.  Firm Deaths and Establishment Deaths, All Wholesale, 2004-2005 
       Firm Size (number of employees) 
    1-9   10-19   20-99   100-499 
Number of establishments  215,794  43,583   52,918   25,902 
Firm  Deaths    26,219   1,767   1,201   130 
Establishment  Deaths   26,429   1,971   1,867   1,002 
Percentage Firm Deaths  99.2%   89.6%   64.3%   13.0% 
Source: Statistics of U.S. Businesses (SUSB). U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of the  
Census, partially funded by the Office of Advocacy, U.S. Small Business Administration.  
 
 
Table 1b.  Firm Deaths and Establishment Deaths, All Retail, 2004-2005 
       Firm Size (number of employees) 
    1-9   10-19   20-99   100-499 
Number of establishments  497,100  94,002   94,625   50,396 
Firm  Deaths    67,758   4,519   2,422   200 
Establishment  Deaths   68,334   5,178   4,221   2,847 
Percentage Firm Deaths  99.2%   87.3%   57.4%    7.0% 
Source: Statistics of U.S. Businesses (SUSB). U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of the  
Census, partially funded by the Office of Advocacy, U.S. Small Business Administration.  
 
  Clearly, the exit of establishments in wholesale and retail firms of under 10 employees 
can be safely assumed to represent industry exit (as over 99 percent of establishment deaths 
correspond to firm death in the data); the overwhelming bulk of such exits in firms of 10-19 
  6employees can also be seen as firm exit (with just under 90 percent of establishment deaths here 
corresponding to firm death).  However, for firms in the 20-99 employee range, less than two-
thirds of establishment exit in wholesale represents firm exit, under 60 percent in retail.  In the 
100-499 category it is safe to say that establishment exit for both wholesale and retail most likely 
involves company restructuring, with only 13 percent of wholesale establishment exits and 7 
percent of retail establishment exits corresponding to firm deaths.  While this study examines 
determinants of establishment exit in this larger size range, it would not be surprising to find 
differences as compared to the smaller size ranges in which industry exit is more accurately 
measured. 
 
  I now turn to measures of exit over time and by industry sector, for the four size 
categories considered here.
5  First, however, over the entire sample, note that survival in the 
retail sector is more difficult than in wholesale:  a 14.6 percent exit rate in the under 10 employee 
category for retail vs. 12.4 for wholesale; 7.4 percent in the 10-19 category for retail vs. 5.4 for 
wholesale; 7.5 percent in the 20-99 category for retail vs. 5.2 for wholesale; and 8.9 percent in 
the 100-499 category for retail vs. 6.1 for wholesale.  By way of comparison, exit rates in 
manufacturing for the same time period averaged 14.3 percent for the 1-9 employee firms, 6.6 
percent for the 10-19 employee firms, and 5.2 for both the 20-99 and 100-499 employee firms.   
In Table 2a note the relatively little variation over the 16-year time frame in exit rates in the 
wholesale sector, 11.9-13.4 percent for the smallest firm size, 4.3-7.0 percent for 10-19 
                                                 
5 One data issue that needs to be mentioned is the change in NAICS codes effective with the 2003-04 exit data; in 
particular a new category was created of wholesale trade agents and brokers (4251).  These firms do not take title to 
the goods they sell, as opposed to other wholesalers (now referred to as “merchant wholesalers”).  This means that 
the data on numbers of establishments and establishment deaths by wholesale industry sector is not consistent over 
the entire period (1999-05) of the NAICS-based sample; it is hoped that this will not bias the time series of exit rates 
and we will discuss this issue later in the estimation discussion. 
  7employee firms, 3.6-7.9 percent for the 20-99 employee firms, and 3.7-8.2 percent for the 100-
499 employee firms.  There does seem to be greater intertemporal variation in retail sector exit 
rates (Table 2b):  13.2-16.2 percent for the 1-9 employee category; 6.2-10.7 for the 10-19 
employee category; 4.8-11.0 for the 20-99 category; and 5.9-12.0 for the 100-499 employee 
firms.   
 
 
Table 2a.  Mean Values of Exit Measures by Year, Wholesale 
       F i r m   S i z e  
     1-9    10-19            20-99    100-499    
1990      12.7   5.3   5.0   6.7 
1991      13.3   5.4   5.9   7.1 
1992      13.4   7.0   6.8   6.8 
1993      12.5   5.1   4.4   6.0 
1994      12.3   5.2   4.7   5.8 
1995      11.5   4.9   4.1   5.2 
1996      11.9         5.4   5.4   6.1 
1997      12.1   6.0   6.8   7.6 
1998      12.3   5.4   4.8   6.9 
1999      12.8   5.4   5.2   5.6 
2000      12.4   5.0   4.8   5.6 
2001      12.6   5.4   4.6   6.5 
2002      13.3   6.7   7.9   8.2 
2003      12.1   5.0   4.8   5.7 
2004      12.0   4.3   3.8   4.5 
2005      11.9   4.4   3.6   3.7 
Source: Statistics of U.S. Businesses (SUSB). U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of the  
Census, partially funded by the Office of Advocacy, U.S. Small Business Administration.  
 
  8Table 2a.  Mean Values of Exit Measures by Year, Retail  
       F i r m   S i z e  
     1-9    10-19            20-99    100-499    
1990      14.6   7.0   7.3   9.6 
1991      15.9   7.3   9.6   11.7 
1992      15.5   10.7   10.4   10.1 
1993      13.4   6.4   6.6   9.2 
1994      14.2   7.0   7.1   7.3 
1995      15.8   6.5   6.3   9.0 
1996      13.4         6.7   6.8   9.1 
1997      13.9   9.0   11.0   12.0 
1998      16.2   8.2   6.7   8.8 
1999      14.9   7.2   6.7   7.6 
2000      13.2   6.3   5.5   7.6 
2001      14.8   6.6   6.1   7.0 
2002      14.6   8.5   9.4   9.6 
2003      14.0   6.5   5.8   6.3 
2004      14.2   6.4   5.5   7.1 
2005      14.7   6.2   4.8   5.9 
Source: Statistics of U.S. Businesses (SUSB). U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of the  
Census, partially funded by the Office of Advocacy, U.S. Small Business Administration.  
 
 
  Across retail and wholesale sectors (Table 3), there is considerable variation in exit 
rates.
6  In terms of the 1-9 employee and 10-19 employee firm exit rates, which are the most 
likely to measure true firm deaths (rather than the shutting down of a location of a multi-store 
operation), the patterns are very consistent:  the highest rates of exit are found in restaurants and 
bars (over 17% per year for the very smallest firms, over 10% per year for the next smallest), the 
lowest rates for the building supply, paint, hardware, and home and garden stores (around 11% 
per year for the very smallest firms, under 5% for the next smallest).   
 
                                                 
6 Given that definitions are somewhat different in the SIC and NAICS samples, results are presented separately for 
the two samples. 
  9Table 3.  Mean Values of Exit Measures by Industry Sector 
          Firm Size 
        1-9  10-19     20-99     100-499   
SIC-basis: 1990-1998 
Wholesale Durable Goods          12.1   5.2      5.1    6.5 
Wholesale Non-durable Goods        12.8   5.9      5.5    6.4 
Building, Hardware, Paint, Garden Stores      11.1    4.7      4.7    6.5 
Motor Vehicle, Auto Supply, Fuel, Gas Dealers    12.2   5.8      6.2    8.2 
General Merchandise Stores, Misc.& Non-store retailers  17.6   8.2      8.6             10.1 
Food, Groceries, Liquor, Drug Stores        15.0   8.3      7.6     8.4 
Clothing and Shoe Stores          17.3  10.4    11.9    14.2 
Furniture, Household Appliances, Computers    13.5   6.9      8.2    10.8 
Eating and Drinking Establishments        17.6  11.0      8.5     6.3 
 
NAICS-basis: 1999-2005 
Wholesale Durable Goods          12.3    5.0      4.8     5.9 
Wholesale Non-durable Goods        12.6    5.4      5.1     5.5 
Building, Hardware, Paint, Garden Stores      10.8     3.9      3.8     3.9 
Motor Vehicle, Auto Supply, Fuel, Gas Dealers    12.6    5.8      4.9     5.7 
General Merchandise Stores, Misc. & Non-store retailers  15.1    6.8      6.5     7.7 
Food, Groceries, Liquor, Drug Stores        13.5    6.5      5.9     7.3 
Clothing and Shoe Stores          14.1    7.0      8.8     10.3 
Furniture, Household Appliances, Computers    13.4    5.7      6.3       9.2 
Eating and Drinking Establishments        17.3  10.1      7.5       6.6 
 
Source: Statistics of U.S. Businesses (SUSB). U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of the  
Census, partially funded by the Office of Advocacy, U.S. Small Business Administration.  
 
  Interestingly, larger eating and drinking retailers (most likely multistore chains) are no 
more likely to shut establishments than are other retail firms of that size.  Clothing and shoe 
retailers have a relatively high rate of establishment exit across all size categories (the highest for 
the 20-99 employee and 100-499 employee firms, second- or third-highest for the two smallest 
size categories).  Wholesaler rates of exit seem not to depend in a systematic way on whether 
they supply durable or non-durable goods (though this will be explored again in the statistical 
analysis to follow).  Clearly there is much cross-industry variation in exit rates to explain in the 
statistical analysis. 
  10  Tables 4, 5, and 6 presents descriptive statistics for the variables to be used in the 
statistical analysis to follow, looking at the SIC and NAICS retail samples, and the full period 
wholesale sample.  Over all industries and years, average exit rates are quite similar in the two 
retail samples for the two smallest size categories, about 14 percent for 1-9 employee firms, 
between 6.5 and 7.5 percent for 10-19 employee firms.  However, establishment exit for the two 
largest size categories seems to have declined substantially in the more recent period.  These 
rates averaged 6.2 percent in the NAICS sample period for the 20-99 employee firms, 7.9 percent 
in the earlier SIC sample period, and similarly averaged 7.1 percent for the 100-499 employee 
firms in the more recent period, 9.6 percent in the 1990s.
7   As an indication of demand growth 
in the industries, one can examine the rate of net change in number of large establishments (ove
500 employee firms) – this averaged a 4.1 percent annual increase in the 1990-1998 period, a 
much smaller 1.8 percent average increase in the 1999-2005 period.   
r 
                                                 
7 As noted earlier, establishment exit in the 100-499 size category is overwhelmingly restructuring rather than firm 
exit. 
  11Table 4.  Descriptive Statistics for SIC-based retail study, 1990-1998 
       Standard 
Variable        Observations  Mean   Deviation  Minimum    Maximum 
Exit Rate (<10)       360   14.29    3.03    7.76    21.81 
Exit Rate (10-19)       360   7.51    3.22    2.18    19.36 
Exit Rate (20-99)       360   7.89    3.80    1.21    28.09 
Exit Rate (100-499)       360   9.58    7.30    0    48.62 
Large Firm Net Change   360   4.10    32.95    -100.00  530.43 
Lagged Real XR Change     9   1.23    4.45    -5.25    11.54   
Lagged Real GDP Change   9   2.89    1.32    -0.17    4.50 
Lagged Wage Cost Change  9    3.68    0.72    2.48    4.81 
Prime Rate             9   7.97    1.28    6.00    10.01 
****************************************************************************** 
 
Table 5.  Descriptive Statistics for NAICS-based retail study, 1999-2005 
       Standard 
Variable        Observations  Mean   Deviation  Minimum    Maximum 
Exit Rate (<10)       210   14.09    2.53    9.78    21.12 
Exit Rate (10-19)       210    6.58    2.27    3.04    13.85 
Exit Rate (20-99)       210    6.18    2.48    2.01    15.18 
Exit Rate (100-499)       210    7.12    3.64    1.47    19.19 
Large Firm Net Change   210    1.79    6.73    -31.17   22.74 
Lagged Real XR Change     7   -0.55    4.81    -8.78    7.09   
Lagged Real GDP Change   7    2.97    1.29    0.75    4.45 
Lagged Wage Cost Change  7     3.78    0.34    3.33    4.24 




Exit Rate by size  =  establishment deaths in size category as percentage of previous year 
establishments by category (Source: SBA) 
Large Firm Net Change = establishment births minus deaths, in firms over 500 employees as 
percentage of previous year establishments of that size (Source:  SBA) 
Real XR Change = annual percentage change in price-adjusted broad dollar index (Source: 
Federal Reserve Board) 
Real GDP Change =  annual percentage change in Real Gross Domestic Product, Chained 2000 
dollars (Source:  U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of Economic Analysis)  
Wage Cost Change = annual percentage change in total labor compensation, private industry, 
all workers (Source:  U.S. Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics) 
Prime Rate = Average majority prime rate charged by banks on short-term loans to business, 
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  For the wholesale industries (Table 6), the annual exit rate for the smallest (under 10-
employee) firms – averaging 12.4 percent over the 1990-2005 period -- was twice that of any of 
the other size categories (with little difference on average between them, between 5.2 and 6.1 
percent).  On average, the number of large wholesale establishments increased by more than 3 
percent per year.  As noted earlier, I include several international and macroeconomic factors in 
the analysis – the Fed’s broad real dollar index, real GDP growth, cost pressures (proxied by the 
aggregate employment cost index), and the prime rate (for short-term business loans).   
 
Table 6.  Descriptive Statistics for wholesale study, 1990-2005 
       Standard 
Variable        Observations  Mean   Deviation  Minimum    Maximum 
Exit Rate (<10)        288  12.44    1.93    8.66    17.47 
Exit Rate (10-19)        288    5.37    1.34    2.46     9.66 
Exit Rate (20-99)        288    5.17    1.65    2.18    10.21 
Exit Rate (100-499)        288    6.13    2.36    1.73    14.48 
Large Firm Net Change    288    3.12    6.30           -10.12    46.85 
Lagged Real XR Change    16    0.45    4.70             -8.78    11.54 
Lagged Real GDP Change  16    2.92    1.31             -0.17      4.50 
Lagged Wage Cost Change 16    3.72    0.59     2.48      4.81 
Prime Rate             16    7.20    1.74     4.12     10.01 
Durable             18    0.50    0.50      0       1 
****************************************************************************** 
Variable Definitions: 
Exit Rate by size  =  establishment deaths in size category as percentage of previous year 
establishments by category (Source: SBA) 
Large Firm Net Change = establishment births minus deaths, in firms over 500 employees as 
percentage of previous year establishments of that size (Source:  SBA) 
Real XR Change = annual percentage change in price-adjusted broad dollar index (Source: 
Federal Reserve Board) 
Real GDP Change =  annual percentage change in Real Gross Domestic Product, Chained 2000 
dollars (Source:  U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of Economic Analysis)  
Wage Cost Change = annual percentage change in total labor compensation, private industry, 
all workers (Source:  U.S. Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics) 
Prime Rate = Average majority prime rate charged by banks on short-term loans to business, 
annualized (Source:  Federal Reserve Board) 
Durable = binary variable, 1 for wholesalers of durable goods, 0 for wholesalers of nondurables. 
  13   In the wholesaler sample, there is the advantage of being able to analyze a relatively long 
time period with considerable variation in macroeconomic conditions, the prime rate varying 
between 4 and 10 percent, annual real exchange rate changes swinging from 9 percent declines to 
12 percent increases, and the real economic growth of between zero and 4.5 percent.  This 
variation suggests an ability in the econometric work to follow to observe impacts of the 
variables on establishment exit rates.   
 
IV. Estimating Equation 
Given problems of comparability between SIC and NAICS codes at the retail level, three 
separate pooled cross-section time series regression studies will be conducted, however with the 
same model specification.  Analysis of 40 retail SIC industries for 1990-1998 yields 360 
observations, while examining 30 retail NAICS industries for 1999-2005 will allow estimation 
on 210 observations.  The wholesale sector codes were relatively unchanged in the transition 
from SIC to NAICS, however, and allow us to combine the NAICS and SIC data; I will thus 
examine 18 wholesale industries for the full 1990-2005 period, allowing estimation on 288 
observations.   
 
The basic model is the following: 
 
Exitit (separately by employment size category – 0-9,10-19,20-99,100-499) =   
f(growth in real GDP, employment cost changes, net change in large firm establishments, 
change in the real-exchange rate, prime loan rate, number of establishments in the industry/size 
category/year cell,  fixed industry effects ) 
  14It seems plausible that wholesalers and retailers dealing in goods which are more heavily 
imported are more likely to be impacted by exchange rate movements; unfortunately, at the level 
of aggregation dealt with here, manufacturing-level import shares are not reliable.
8  Therefore 
rather than include import shares into the regression analysis, I will instead examine those 
wholesale and retail industries which the analysis reveals to be most affected by exchange rate 
pressures and see what patterns emerge.  As industries are likely to differ in the variability of exit 
rates, heteroscedasticity is a problem that needs to be addressed; furthermore, previous work has 
suggested the presence of some within-industry autocorrelation.  Therefore, estimates will be 
obtained via Feasible Generalized Least Squares (FGLS) correcting for both issues (using the 
xtgls command in STATA).  While exit rates are bounded below by zero and above by 100 
percent, suggesting the need for an estimation method explicitly accommodating a limited (or 
censored) dependent variable, the results presented below are quite similar to those produced via 
a panel data Tobit estimation approach.
9 
 
The explanatory variables include: 
(1) annual rates of change in a broad real exchange rate index –to see whether exit is 
induced by an appreciating dollar; 
(2) annual changes in real GDP;  
                                                 
8The wholesale categories are quite broad.  Consider some examples:  category 4211 includes motor vehicles, but 
also tires and tubes, parts and supplies (car batteries, axles, auto glass); 4212 includes furniture, but also home 
furnishings ranging from carpeting and curtains to cookware and utensils, napkins, towels, china and flatware; 4213 
includes wood construction materials, and wood cabinets, but also construction materials of brick, stone, metal, 
glass, roofing materials; 4214 includes film, television cameras, projectors, ATM machines, calculators, safes, 
computers and printers, computer software, eyeglasses, contact lenses, medical equipment, surveying equipment, 
restaurant and other commercial equipment.  It is not possible to get meaningful import shares averaged over these 
disparate groups. 
 
9 This is likely due to the fact that there are very few observations with exit rates at either extreme (i.e., at either zero 
or one hundred). 
  15(3) annual changes in an index of aggregate labor compensation rates; this is included to 
account for effects on exit rates of cost trends; 
(4) the prime rate on short-term business loans (as financing costs may be a major 
consideration for small firms needing to carry inventories); 
(5) growth rates in the number of establishments in firms of over 500 employees; this 
variable can be interpreted as a proxy for growth potential perceived by smaller firms in the same 
retail or wholesale sector (though may also pick up the extent to which small firms feel 
threatened by large firm expansion); 
(6) whether the industry sells primarily durable vs. nondurable goods; 
(7) the number of establishments in the industry/size cell at the beginning of the year; 
(8) fixed industry effects to capture other cross-sectional variation. 
 
Timing issues are of course important to consider.  The SUSB exit data are for the year 
ending in March, while the demand and cost proxies, real GDP and the Employment Cost Index, 
are changes in annual averages – therefore these will be lagged one year.  Similarly, exchange 
rate changes are end-of-year annual changes; these will also be lagged one year in determining 
international pressures on exit rates.   
 
V.  Econometric Results 
To start, Table 7 presents results explaining exit rates within the four small-firm size 
categories for 18 wholesale industry categories over the 1990 to 2005 period.  Several results 
stand out and are quite consistent across all four size categories of small wholesalers:   
  16(1) aggregate demand growth in the  economy reduces wholesaler exit, with a one-
percentage point increase in GDP growth leading to between 0.2 and 0.9 percentage point 




(2) for all size categories increased cost pressures, either through labor compensation 
increases or high interest costs, increase exit rates;  
 
(3) of most interest to this study, currency appreciation seems to have a strong adverse 
impact on wholesalers (after controlling for cost trends and the state of the economy), 
especially in the over-10-employee firms; a ten-percentage-point appreciation leads to 
between an 0.8 and 1.5 percentage point increase in exit rates for these size categories, 
corresponding to a roughly 20 percent increase in exit rates.
11  
 
  The latter impact of exchange rate changes suggests that the fortunes of small 
wholesalers are perhaps more tied in with manufacturers than might have been thought.  As the 
currency appreciates and imports of manufactured goods put pressure on producers of domestic 
goods, a significant share of wholesalers seem unable to survive by switching to deal in these 
(now lower-priced) imported goods.
12  Attempts to find wholesale-industry-varying exchange 
                                                 
10 In an alternative specification, allowing the impact of GDP growth to vary across industries, the other results of 
interest were largely unaffected. 
11 A much smaller – though statistically significant –  adverse effect is found for the 1-9 employee firms. 
12 As noted earlier, the 2004 and 2005 wholesale sector definitions were changed to exclude “wholesale trade agents 
and brokers”; inclusion of a dummy variable to distinguish these two years and an interaction term between this 
dummy variable and the exchange rate variable had little impact on results of interest.  An alternative approach, 
dropping these last two years from the analysis also produced little change from what is reported in Table 6; the only 
one of interest is that the very small but statistically significant adverse exchange rate impact on the smallest 
wholesalers is no longer statistically significant from zero. 
  17rate impacts were generally unsuccessful, however there was some suggestion that alcoholic 
beverage distributors may be especially strongly impacted by currency fluctuations (as either 
contractual or long-term relationships may tie them closely to US manufacturers). 
 
Table 7.  Feasible Generalized Least Squares Results Explaining Small-Wholesaler 
Exit Rates by Firm Size, adjusted for heteroscedasticity across industries, 
autocorrelation, fixed industry effects–1990-2005  
(standard errors in parentheses below estimated coefficients) 
 
     1-9   10-19   20-99   100-499 
 
GDP  growth      -0.22*** -0.59*** -0.94*** -0.51*** 
    (0.03)   (0.05)   (0.07)   (0.10) 
 
Aggregate  wage  growth  0.36*** -0.14** -0.30** 0.11 
    (0.07)   (0.07)   (0.10)   (0.16) 
 
Prime  rate    0.03   0.20***  0.35***  0.17** 
    (0.03)   (0.03)   (0.05)   (0.07) 
 
Real exchange rate change  0.018**  0.092***  0.113***  0.150*** 
    (0.008)   (0.009)   (0.013)   (0.019) 
 
Large Firm Growth    -0.009   -0.017**  0.010     -0.020 
    (0.006)   (0.008)   (0.012)   (0.017) 
 
Nondurable  good    2.17*** 0.94*** 0.30    0.91** 
    (0.37)   (0.23)   (0.30)   (0.46) 
 
Number of establishments  -0.00003  -0.00039***  -0.00035***  -0.00034 
    (0.00003)  (0.00008)  (0.00010)  (0.00044) 
 
N     288   288   288   288 
Wald  Chi-squared    1370.4***  889.8*** 550.3*** 417.4*** 
Rho     0.41   -0.10   -0.08   -0.03 
 




The impact of large firm growth on small wholesaler exit rates is statistically significant  
only for the 10-19 employee size category, and there reducing exit, rejecting a crowding-out 
  18effect (rather viewing this growth as a harbinger of good things to come in the wholesale sector).  
It does appear that patterns of exit differ depending on whether the goods dealt in are durable or 
nondurables,
13 with nondurables showing higher rates of exit ceteris paribus – statistically 
significant for 3 of the 4 size categories (perhaps the greater perishability of the goods involved 
places these wholesalers in more of a risky situation).  In addition, the number of establishments 
in each size/industry category is a useful control for exit rates, smaller groups implying higher 
exit rates ceteris paribus, though only statistically significant for the two medium-sized 
categories of wholesalers.
14   
 
Tables 8 and 9 examine the same issues for retailers for the decades of the 1990s and 
2000s, respectively, using the SIC-based and NAICS-based samples separately (differences in 
retail industry classifications made the construction of a combined retailer dataset impossible).  
For both time periods, it is quite clear that domestic macroeconomic conditions are the primary 
force driving retailer survival – GDP growth reduces exit rates in all 8 regressions (statistically 
significant in all but one case), employee compensation rate growth and interest rates increase 
exit rates in 15 of 16 cases (statistically significant in 14 of these).   
 
Large retailer growth within each industry sector, in contrast has mixed and generally 
weak impacts on small-retailer exit rates, with the exception of the very smallest (1-9 employee) 
categories which seem to be crowded out by the success of the over 500-employee retailers.  
                                                 
13 However, in results not presented here, there was no statistically significant difference in exchange rate responses 
for durable vs. nondurable goods wholesalers, except in the over-100-employee firms for which nondurable goods 
wholesalers seemed more adversely affected by exchange rate pressures. 
14 Results for the main variables of interest (especially the exchange rate) are generally unaffected by the inclusion 
of the number of establishments in the regression equation.  This holds true for the retail regressions discussed 
below, as well. 
  19This latter result is suggestive of a “Wal-Mart” (or more generally “big box store”) effect 
changing the competitive environment for independent, single-store, retailers.  Of course, this 
issue is not the primary focus of this report and further study would be required to make any 
more definitive claims. 
 
Table 8.  Feasible Generalized Least Squares Results Explaining Small-Retailer 
Exit Rates by Firm Size, adjusted for heteroscedasticity across industries, 
autocorrelation, fixed industry effects–SIC-based sample, 1990-1998 
(standard errors in parentheses below estimated coefficients) 
 
     1-9   10-19   20-99   100-499 
 
GDP  growth      -0.23*** -1.00*** -0.70*** -0.14 
    (0.04)   (0.10)   (0.11)   (0.14) 
 
Aggregate wage growth  0.57***  -0.28***   0.16    0.38** 
    (0.06)   (0.10)   (0.14)   (0.18) 
 
Prime  rate      0.16*** 0.20*** 0.27*** 0.04** 
    (0.04)   (0.07)   (0.09)   (0.07) 
 
Real exchange rate change  0.005    0.158***  0.022    -0.023 
    (0.009)   (0.021)   (0.026)   (0.032) 
 
Large Firm Growth    0.006***  0.002     -0.010*  -0.012* 
    (0.001)   (0.004)   (0.005)   (0.007) 
 
Number of establishments  0.00003*  -0.00008  0.00001  -0.00028* 
    (0.00002)  (0.00010)  (0.00009)  (0.00015) 
 
N     360   360   360   360 
Wald  Chi-squared   4125.6*** 1750.6*** 765.4***  452.4*** 
Rho     0.25   -0.25   -0.01   0.05 
 
*Significant at 10%            **Significant at 5%                 ***Significant at 1% 
 
 
The international considerations of primary interest to this study, perhaps not 
surprisingly, have much less impact on the retail sector than on wholesalers.  While the estimated 
  20effect of dollar appreciation is to increase exit rates in 7 of the 8 cases, these effects are only 
consistently significant for the 10-19 employee firms and quite small for the other retailer size 
categories (only statistically significant for one of those 6 cases).   The only impact which is both 
statistically significant and of economic importance is the exchange rate impact for the 10-19 
employee firms during the 1990-1998 period, where a ten percentage point appreciation leads to 
a 1.6 percentage point increase in exit rates (which is however a more than 20 percent increase 
over the mean value).   
 
Table 9.  Feasible Generalized Least Squares Results Explaining Small-Retailer 
Exit Rates by Firm Size, adjusted for heteroscedasticity across industries, 
autocorrelation, fixed industry effects–NAICS-based sample, 1999-2005 
(standard errors in parentheses below estimated coefficients) 
 
     1-9   10-19   20-99   100-499 
 
GDP  growth      -0.21*** -1.02*** -2.02*** -1.33*** 
    (0.06)   (0.09)   (0.12)   (0.17) 
 
Aggregate  wage  growth  0.43*** 0.48***   0.92***  0.61** 
    (0.11)   (0.15)   (0.22)   (0.30) 
 
Prime  rate      0.14*** 0.53*** 1.17*** 0.83*** 
    (0.05)   (0.07)   (0.10)   (0.14) 
 
Real exchange rate change  0.016    0.024*   0.014    0.045* 
    (0.010)   (0.014)   (0.020)   (0.028) 
 
Large Firm Growth    0.014**  0.003     -0.0005  0.076*** 
    (0.006)   (0.007)   (0.014)   (0.023) 
 
Number of establishments  0.00011***  -0.00014  -0.00001  0.00057* 
    (0.00003)  (0.00013)  (0.00016)  (0.00030) 
 
N     210   210   210   210 
Wald Chi-squared    123820.1***  2232.9***  988.2***  758.6*** 
Rho     0.20   -0.05   0.04   -0.02 
 
*Significant at 10%         **Significant at 5%           ***Significant at 1% 
  21  If one looks at exchange rate impacts varying by type of retail establishment, some 
interesting patterns emerge.  The relevant exchange rate effects are reported in Table 10 (other 
estimated coefficients are available on request from the author).    A surprisingly strong adverse 
impact of dollar appreciation on 10-19 employee retailers seems to hold across all sectors in the 
1990-98 period, but the only retail sector in which this impact is statistically significant for all 
three of the under-100 employee size categories in that time period is that involving auto-related 
dealers.  The latter would seem to be a category of retailer closely identified with domestic 
manufacturers – to the extent a stronger currency weakens the latter it would put pressure on 
their 
 
Table 10.  Exchange-rate Effects on Small-Retailer Exit Rates by Firm Size and 
Retailer Type 
 
SIC-based sample – 1990-1998: 
      1-9           10-19    20-99             100-499 
 
Building, Hardware, Paint, Garden Stores  -0.04**     0.11***      0.02     -0.08 
Motor Vehicle, Auto Supply, Fuel, Gas          0.04**      0.16***      0.09**    -0.02 
General Merchandise Stores, Misc.       0.03        0.18***     -0.04      0.07 
Food, Groceries, Liquor, Drug Stores     0.04**      0.20***      0.03      0.01 
Clothing and Shoe Stores      -0.06***    0.13**     -0.07     -0.05 
Furniture, Household Appliances, Computers 0.01         0.12**     -0.08     -0.34*** 
Eating and Drinking Establishments      0.00         0.22**       0.08      0.04 
 
 
NAICS-based sample – 1999-2005: 
      1-9         10-19      20-99  100-499 
 
Building, Hardware, Paint, Garden Stores   0.04***      -0.00        0.03      0.07* 
Motor Vehicle, Auto Supply, Fuel, Gas   0.04**         0.00      -0.01     -0.00 
General Merchandise Stores, Misc.     0.02           0.03        0.06**      0.04 
Food, Groceries, Liquor, Drug Stores              -0.02           0.01      -0.09**      0.05 
Clothing and Shoe Stores                -0.04           0.11**        0.28**      0.07 
Furniture, Household Appliances, Computers -0.02           0.08***        0.04     -0.21 
Eating and Drinking Establishments     -0.06**      -0.03       -0.07      0.08 
 
  22 
*Significant at 10%             **Significant at 5%                   ***Significant at 1% 
dealers (especially smaller ones who may not be diversified into broader product lines including 
imports).
15  In contrast, there are a number of negative coefficients (suggesting less exit with a 
stronger dollar) – though only some statistically significant -- for hardware, paint and garden 
stores, clothing stores, furniture dealers, and eating and drinking establishments.  These latter 
types of retailers might be expected to gain from a stronger dollar in being able to obtain cheaper 
imported goods.  
 
VI. Conclusions 
While results are not completely consistent across time periods (for the retail sector) and 
across the various small firm size categories, there are certain findings which seem reasonably 
robust.  One is that international pressures, in the form of real exchange rate appreciation, lead to 
significantly increased rates of small-firm exit in the wholesale sector, similar to the effect 
previously found for manufacturing, particularly in the over-10-employee size category where a 
10 percent real appreciation leads to a roughly 20 percent increase in exit.  This suggests that a 
substantial share of domestic wholesalers, rather than taking advantage of lower import prices to 
lower their costs in the distribution chain, are tied fairly closely to domestic manufacturers – with 
the result that economic woes encountered by manufacturers during currency appreciation are 
passed downstream.   
 
                                                 
15 The fact that this seems to be less of an issue (in this sample only for the very smallest dealers) in the 1999-2005 
period may be attributed to a more recent trend of multiple car-line dealers who should be less affected by currency 
fluctuations, as well as to the increasing tendency of domestic auto manufacturers to produce cars abroad.    
  23One might expect retailers to gain from an appreciation lowering the prices of goods they 
sell; here, though, one finds at best no impact on average.  However, effects vary by retail sector 
– auto dealers, not surprisingly, share the pain experienced by domestic manufacturers under 
these circumstances, while stores which generally sell a mix (and easily changing mix) of 
imports and domestic goods (hardware, paint and garden stores, clothing stores, furniture dealers, 
and eating and drinking establishments) are benefited in terms of reduced exit when the currency 
appreciates.    
 
Other results of interest are that wholesalers of nondurable goods industries – perhaps 
due to risk associated with their greater perishability – have higher rates of small-firm exit than 
do others.   In addition, while certainly not a surprising results, both wholesale and retail exit 
respond as one would expect to business cycle and cost factors, stronger growth reducing exit 
rates and cost increases putting greater pressure on small firms.  Future work should examine in 
more detail the dynamics of small firm exit and entry within the entire distribution chain from 
manufacturing to retail, and the extent to which international shocks impact these relationships. 
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